Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues
Penulis
: James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain
Subyek
: Civil rights—United States, Constitutional law, Civics, Civil society—United States, Cultural pluralism—United States, Liberalism
Penerbit
: Harvard University Press
Ringkasan :In recent years, communitarian, civic republican, and progressive
thinkers and politicians have argued that our constitutional
system takes individual rights too seriously, to the neglect of
responsibilities, virtues, and the common good. “No rights without
responsibilities,” a slogan of Third Way thought, encapsulates this perceived
imbalance.1 Similarly, President Barack Obama in his inaugural
address called for a “new era of responsibility.”2 Liberal theories of
rights, critics argue, exalt rights over responsibilities, licensing irresponsible
conduct and spawning frivolous assertions of rights at the expense
of encouraging personal responsibility and responsibility to community.
These theories, critics say, require neutrality among competing conceptions
of the good life, undermining civil society as “seedbeds of virtue”
and precluding government from promoting good lives. Worse yet, liberal
theories justify rights of autonomy on the ground of “empty” toleration
of wrong conduct instead of respect for the personal capacity for
responsibility or recognition of the substantive moral goods or virtues
promoted by protecting such rights. Finally, liberal theories take rights
too absolutely, to the subordination of responsibilities, virtues, and the
common good, and in doing so debilitate the political processes and
impoverish judgment. Ronald Dworkin’s famous book, Taking Rights
Seriously, with his idea of rights as “trumps,”3 is the bête noire of proponents
of such charges of irresponsibility, neutrality, wrongness, and
absoluteness. Liberalism, critics claim, promotes “liberty as license”
rather than securing “ordered liberty This book answers these charges against liberal theories of rights. We
propose an account of rights that (1) takes responsibilities as well as
rights seriously, permitting government to encourage responsibility in
the exercise of rights but not to compel what it holds is the responsible
decision; (2) supports what we, following Michael Sandel, call a “formative
project”4 of civil society and government promoting responsibility,
inculcating civic virtue, fostering citizens’ capacities for democratic and
personal self-government,
and securing ordered liberty and equal citizenship
for all; (3) justifies rights of autonomy on the basis not of “empty”
toleration, but of toleration as respect, together with the capacity for
responsibility and the substantive moral goods furthered by securing
such rights; and (4) protects basic liberties (such as freedom of association
and rights of autonomy) stringently but not absolutely, through
reasoned
judgment concerning ordered liberty without precluding government
from encouraging responsibility or inculcating civic virtues. We
develop an account of responsibility that takes rights seriously, avoids
submerging the individual into the community, and appreciates the value
of diversity in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy. We
defend our understanding of the relationships among rights, responsibilities,
and virtues by applying it to several matters of current controversy:
reproductive freedom, the proper roles and regulation of civil
society and the family, education of children, clashes between First
Amendment freedoms (of association and religion) and antidiscrimination
law, and rights to intimate association and same-sex
marriage.
Daftar copy :
No. |
Barcode |
Lokasi |
No. Rak |
Ketersediaan |
1 |
00131582 |
Perpustakaan Pusat |
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TIDAK DIPINJAMKAN |
Diproses dalam : 0.16036891937256 detik