Explanatory Models in Linguistics
Subject
: Psycholinguistic, Mentalism in Linguistics
Publisher
: Princeton University Press
Summary :Contemporary students of language have two courses open
to them: they can approach the subject matter as a natural
phenomenon or they can consider it a formal object. In the first
case, the relevant techniques of analysis are those of behavioral
science. Language is behavior. An effective treatment requires
that the activity of speaker and listener be systematically related
to the independent variables of which it is a function. If, on the
other hand, they choose to study language as an object, they
must be aware of certain self-imposed limitations. Basic among
these is the fact that they are not studying behavior but its
traces, written or spoken. In bringing to bear the general outlook
of the formal sciences on natural languages, they are giving full
expression to a long-standing tradition whereby a language is
construed as a system of entities that can presumably be dealt
with on its own terms.
The legacy of traditional philology is textual. Writing seems
to have been responsible for the view, strengthened later by
sound recording, that the physical effects of verbal behavior are
the stuff of which languages are made. Numerous everyday
expressions perpetuate the resulting view of language as a tool
or instrument. But the modern analyst should be able to make
the distinction.
For all its emphasis on spoken language, structural linguistics
has followed in the same tradition. The development of ever
more refined descriptive techniques has relied heavily on the
preliminary transcription of recorded samples of speech. That
leaves the analyst with data, say, the dependent variable, usually
two steps removed from their original setting. Structuralists
emphasize the notion of "system"; they necessarily capitalize
on form. Form, not meaning, lends itself to systematic analysis
(at least in principle). It has been said that linguistics can be
scientific without being semantic. Meaning is reckoned with, at
best, on the basis of posited formal relations. But meaning proves as inescapable as it proves elusive. The realm of meaning
is the realm of the independent variables: to keep form and
meaning apart is to retain, if not actually strengthen, traditional
dualisms. It is a short step from there to some form of mentalism.
Copies :
No. |
Barcode |
Location |
No. Shelf |
Availability |
1 |
00131432 |
Perpustakaan Pusat |
|
TIDAK DIPINJAMKAN |